VC Platform API (3.34.0)

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License: Proprietary

Account/organization management, API key issuance, and multi-format credential issuance/verification for the VC Platform rebuild (see /requirements/PRD.md §5.1-§5.8). Covers everything implemented through Phase 2: org/membership CRUD, API keys, credential templates, four credential formats (VC-JWT, W3C VC 2.0 as JWT, W3C VC 1.1 with JSON-LD Data Integrity proofs, SD-JWT VC) over both the direct REST API and OpenID4VCI/VP 1.0 Final, Bitstring Status List revocation, the queryable audit trail, usage metering, and outbound webhooks (PRD §5.7/§5.9).

Console endpoints authenticate with an OIDC access token; the machine endpoints (Credentials, offers, presentations) authenticate with an org-scoped API key. Each operation states which it expects.

Organizations

Org creation and the caller's org list (PRD §5.1)

Create an organization

Creates the org and adds the caller as its first admin member, in one transaction. No RLS exemption needed: the org id is generated app-side and the tenant context is set to it before the insert.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
Request Body schema: application/json
required
name
required
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters
slug
required
string^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9-]{1,62}$

Lowercase alphanumeric with hyphens, 2-63 chars, starting alphanumeric.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "name": "string",
  • "slug": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "name": "string",
  • "slug": "string",
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

List the caller's organizations

Pre-tenant lookup via the list_user_memberships() database function — runs before any org context exists.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Rename an organization

Admin-only. The slug is immutable — it appears in issuer identifiers that already-issued credentials point at.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
name
required
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "name": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "name": "string",
  • "slug": "string",
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Members

Org membership management, admin-gated except listing (PRD §5.1)

List pending invitations

Admin-only. Invitations that have not yet been accepted — an invited address becomes a member on its first login.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Revoke a pending invitation

Admin-only. Has no effect on an invitation that has already been accepted — that is a membership, removed via the members endpoint.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
invitationId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

Resend a pending invitation's email

Admin-only. Re-sends the invite notification email without changing the invitation itself — use when the original delivery was missed or the recipient asks again.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
invitationId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

List an organization's members

Any member may list. A non-member gets the same 403 as a nonexistent org id — the membership check doubles as the tenant-existence check.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Add a member

Admin-only. If the address belongs to an existing user of the identity provider this deployment uses now, they become a member immediately (status: active). Otherwise a pending invitation is recorded (status: invited, userId: null) and resolved into a membership when that address next signs in. Accounts left by a previous identity provider do not count. Emails are compared without regard to case. If two current accounts share the address, the request is refused with 409 and nobody is added.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
email
required
string <email>
role
required
string (OrgRole)
Enum: "admin" "developer" "auditor" "billing"

Org roles per PRD §5.1.

displayName
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "email": "user@example.com",
  • "role": "admin",
  • "displayName": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "userId": "2c4a230c-5085-4924-a3e1-25fb4fc5965b",
  • "email": "user@example.com",
  • "role": "admin",
  • "status": "active"
}

Change a member's role

Admin-only. Refuses to demote the last remaining admin.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
userId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
role
required
string (OrgRole)
Enum: "admin" "developer" "auditor" "billing"

Org roles per PRD §5.1.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "role": "admin"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "orgId": "25b2c2d5-a7fc-47d0-89e4-8709a1560bfa",
  • "userId": "2c4a230c-5085-4924-a3e1-25fb4fc5965b",
  • "role": "admin",
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Remove a member

Admin-only. Refuses to remove the last remaining admin.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
userId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

API Keys

Org-scoped API key issuance, listing, and revocation (PRD §5.2)

Issue an API key

Admin-only. The plaintext secret is returned exactly once in this response — only its SHA-256 hash is persisted. There is no way to retrieve it again after this call.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
name
required
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters
scopes
required
Array of strings (ApiKeyScope) non-empty
Items Enum: "issue" "verify" "admin" "agent-present"
agentIds
Array of strings <uuid> [ 1 .. 20 ] items unique [ items <uuid > ]

Required with the agent-present scope, and refused without it: the live agent identities of this organisation the key may present for. The scope cannot be combined with another one.

verifierOrgIds
Array of strings <uuid> [ 1 .. 20 ] items unique [ items <uuid > ]

Required with the agent-present scope, and refused without it: the organisations whose presentation requests the key may answer. Without this a stolen key could present the agent's identity to any verifier on the platform.

expiresAt
string <date-time>

ISO 8601 timestamp. Omit for a key that doesn't expire.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "name": "string",
  • "scopes": [
    ],
  • "agentIds": [
    ],
  • "verifierOrgIds": [
    ],
  • "expiresAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "name": "string",
  • "keyPrefix": "string",
  • "scopes": [
    ],
  • "agentIds": [
    ],
  • "verifierOrgIds": [
    ],
  • "createdBy": "25a02396-1048-48f9-bf93-102d2fb7895e",
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "expiresAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "lastUsedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "revokedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "secret": "string"
}

List API keys

Any member may list. Never includes the secret or its hash.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Revoke an API key

Admin-only. Idempotent — revoking an already-revoked key returns 204 without recording a second audit event.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
keyId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

Templates

Credential template & schema management, console-managed (PRD §5.3).

A template's name and (optional) description are also served publicly, at the host root (not under /api), as the SD-JWT VC Type Metadata document for its dc+sd-jwt credentials (draft-ietf-oauth-sd-jwt-vc-19 §5.3.1): a plain GET on the vct value baked into every such credential, no .well-known indirection.

  • GET /vct/v1/{orgId}/{templateId} — { vct, name, description? }; 404 if the template doesn't exist or doesn't offer dc+sd-jwt.
  • GET /vct/v1/skills/{name}/{version} — the same document for a skill type: one definition per deployment, identical for every organisation, so every issuer of the skill emits the same vct ({PLATFORM_PUBLIC_URL}/vct/v1/skills/{name}/{version}; the host differs between sandbox and production, so pin one per environment). Each claim is sd: never and mandatory. 404 for an unknown skill or version. A version never changes: credentials already issued commit to its exact content through vct#integrity. Currently: payment-order-create versions 1 and 2 (an agent may create payment orders in the named application, within stated limits; not a mandate to execute a payment). Version 2 adds payee_policy (listed or any) and max_amount_per_day. account-transactions-read version 1 (an agent may read the bookings of listed accounts in the named application; it cannot create anything). Create an organisation's template for it with POST /orgs/{orgId}/templates/skill-types/{name}/{version}.

Create a credential template

Admin-only. claimsSchema is checked against subjectClaims at issuance only for a template that sets enforceClaimsSchema: true; for every other template it is stored and not checked. formats declares which wire formats this template may be rendered in; all five CredentialFormat values have a renderer. Revocation is narrower: bitstring-status-list is implemented, token-status-list is declarable but rejected at issuance, and mso_mdoc has no revocation mechanism at all yet — declaring revocable: true for it is accepted at creation time but rejected with 400 at issuance.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
name
required
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters
description
string [ 1 .. 2000 ] characters

Shown alongside name in the SD-JWT VC Type Metadata document served at this template's vct URI (GET /vct/v1/{orgId}/{templateId}).

mdocNamespace
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters

mso_mdoc only: the ISO 18013-5 namespace the credential's claims live under (the docType stays name). Omitted = org.iso.18013.5.1 for a template named org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL, otherwise name. Used for both issuance and presentation requests.

claimsSchema
required
object

A JSON Schema the subjectClaims are meant to satisfy. Accepted and stored for every template; checked at issuance only when enforceClaimsSchema is true. The dialect follows $schema (2020-12, 2019-09, otherwise draft-07). One exception for mso_mdoc: a top-level property declared { "type": "string", "format": "date" } is issued as CBOR full-date (tag 1004) and must be a valid YYYY-MM-DD.

enforceClaimsSchema
boolean
Default: false

When true, every credential's subjectClaims must satisfy claimsSchema before it is signed, on every path (POST /credentials, OpenID4VCI offers and issuance, agent tools): a violation is a 400 whose violations list names each rule that was broken by claim path. It never repeats a claim value. An OpenID4VCI offer is checked when it is created, not when the wallet collects it. Requires a claimsSchema that is a valid JSON Schema (400 otherwise). Off by default: claimsSchema was not checked historically, so existing templates are unaffected. Editable at any time, also on an integrity-enabled template.

formats
required
Array of strings (CredentialFormat) non-empty
Items Enum: "vc+jwt" "vc11+ld" "vc20" "dc+sd-jwt" "mso_mdoc"
validityPeriodDays
integer >= 1

If set, an issued credential's validUntil is validFrom + this many days. Omit for a credential that doesn't expire.

revocable
boolean
Default: false

Whether credentials from this template can be revoked. Intent only — which status mechanism carries it is determined by the credential's format, not chosen here, because the format's own specification decides. When true, issuance allocates a status entry and the renderer embeds the pointer its format defines.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "name": "string",
  • "description": "string",
  • "mdocNamespace": "string",
  • "claimsSchema": { },
  • "enforceClaimsSchema": false,
  • "formats": [
    ],
  • "validityPeriodDays": 1,
  • "revocable": false
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "orgId": "25b2c2d5-a7fc-47d0-89e4-8709a1560bfa",
  • "name": "string",
  • "description": "string",
  • "mdocNamespace": "string",
  • "claimsSchema": { },
  • "enforceClaimsSchema": true,
  • "formats": [
    ],
  • "validityPeriodDays": 0,
  • "revocable": true,
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

List an organization's credential templates

Any member may list.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Create this organisation's template for a skill type

Admin-only. Creates the template for a registered skill type (see the Templates tag for the document served for it), with every field taken from the definition: the canonical vct, its claim metadata (all sd: never), the claimsSchema with enforceClaimsSchema on, dc+sd-jwt only, revocable, and vct#integrity on. Credentials issued from it therefore carry the skill's canonical vct and an integrity value equal to the hash of the document served for the skill.

Credentials of a skill type are issued only through an approved grant (the Agent skills tag): an administrator, signed in to the console, who re-authenticated for exactly those terms. POST /credentials, OpenID4VCI offers, the MCP tools and the end-user flow all answer 403 for such a template, whatever the caller's key or role.

Idempotent: an organisation has one template per skill type version, and a repeated call returns it unchanged with status 200, whether or not this call created it. validityPeriodDays is only read when the template is created; change it afterwards with PATCH.

The vct namespace {PLATFORM_PUBLIC_URL}/vct/v1/skills/ is reserved: POST /orgs/{orgId}/templates refuses a vct under it. A skill template can be changed only in validityPeriodDays and keyAttestationRequired; a different definition is a new skill type version.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
name
required
string
Example: payment-order-create
version
required
integer >= 1
Request Body schema: application/json
optional
validityPeriodDays
integer [ 1 .. 365 ]

Validity of an issued skill credential, in days. Default: the skill type's (1 day for payment-order-create); at most the skill type's cap (90 days there), because a skill is authority and is meant to be short-lived.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "validityPeriodDays": 1
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "orgId": "25b2c2d5-a7fc-47d0-89e4-8709a1560bfa",
  • "name": "string",
  • "description": "string",
  • "mdocNamespace": "string",
  • "claimsSchema": { },
  • "enforceClaimsSchema": true,
  • "formats": [
    ],
  • "validityPeriodDays": 0,
  • "revocable": true,
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Get a credential template

Any member may read. A nonexistent or foreign-org template id gets 404 — same no-leak pattern as everywhere else org-scoped.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
templateId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "orgId": "25b2c2d5-a7fc-47d0-89e4-8709a1560bfa",
  • "name": "string",
  • "description": "string",
  • "mdocNamespace": "string",
  • "claimsSchema": { },
  • "enforceClaimsSchema": true,
  • "formats": [
    ],
  • "validityPeriodDays": 0,
  • "revocable": true,
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Update a credential template

Admin-only, partial update. Affects future issuance only — credentials already issued from this template are signed artifacts and do not change. PRD §5.3's "without code deploys" is what this exists for.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
templateId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
name
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters
description
string [ 1 .. 2000 ] characters
mdocNamespace
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters

See CreateTemplateRequest.mdocNamespace.

claimsSchema
object

See CreateTemplateRequest.claimsSchema. Replacing it with a schema that is not valid JSON Schema is a 400 while enforceClaimsSchema is on.

enforceClaimsSchema
boolean

See CreateTemplateRequest.enforceClaimsSchema.

formats
Array of strings (CredentialFormat) non-empty
Items Enum: "vc+jwt" "vc11+ld" "vc20" "dc+sd-jwt" "mso_mdoc"
validityPeriodDays
integer >= 1
revocable
boolean

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "name": "string",
  • "description": "string",
  • "mdocNamespace": "string",
  • "claimsSchema": { },
  • "enforceClaimsSchema": true,
  • "formats": [
    ],
  • "validityPeriodDays": 1,
  • "revocable": true
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "orgId": "25b2c2d5-a7fc-47d0-89e4-8709a1560bfa",
  • "name": "string",
  • "description": "string",
  • "mdocNamespace": "string",
  • "claimsSchema": { },
  • "enforceClaimsSchema": true,
  • "formats": [
    ],
  • "validityPeriodDays": 0,
  • "revocable": true,
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Delete a credential template

Admin-only. Already-issued credentials survive — they are self-contained signed documents, and the audit trail keeps its record of them.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
templateId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

Agent skills

Granting an agent a skill (see the skill types under Templates): authority a relying party acts on, within stated limits. Console session only, organisation administrator, never an API key or the agent itself, because a skill is granted by a person who has just authenticated again.

The flow, in three steps:

  1. POST .../skills/approvals: name the agent and the terms. The platform fills in the agent, the skill and its version, checks the grant against the skill type's schema, and records exactly what would be signed, with a SHA-256 termsHash and a one-time nonce. Nothing is issued.
  2. (Multi-factor authentication is always required for this step: the administrator needs a second factor enrolled at the identity provider, or cannot approve.) Send the administrator back through the identity provider's authorization endpoint with max_age=0 (or prompt=login) and nonce=<that nonce>. The ID token that comes back carries auth_time, amr and the nonce. (An OIDC provider reports these in the ID token, not the access token: Zitadel documents auth_time, amr and acr as ID token claims only.)
  3. POST .../approve with that ID token, authenticated as the same administrator. The platform verifies the token, checks that the nonce is this approval's, that auth_time is recent (default 300 seconds, SKILL_APPROVAL_MAX_AUTH_AGE_SECONDS) and later than the request for approval, spends the approval once, and only then issues the credential, from the terms stored in step 1 and never from anything sent with the approval.

A session that did not come from the identity provider (credential login, the local dev header) has no ID token and cannot approve. The audit trail records the approver, when and how they authenticated (amr) and the terms hash. Every other route to a skill credential is refused: POST /credentials, OpenID4VCI offers, the MCP tools and the end-user flow answer 403.

List the organisation's agent identities

Admin or auditor. Agents are created through the MCP endpoint with an API key; this lists them for the console.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

List the skills granted to an agent

Admin or auditor. Includes who approved each grant, when and how they authenticated, and the hash of the terms they were shown.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
agentId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Start granting an agent a skill (step 1 of 3)

Admin only, console session. Records exactly what would be signed and returns what the console must show the administrator for approval, plus the nonce to send through the identity provider (step 2). Issues nothing. The approval is valid for 10 minutes, can be approved once, and only by the administrator who requested it.

The organisation's template for the skill type is created from the definition if it has none yet. The credential's validity is that template's (1 day by default for payment-order-create); it is part of the terms the administrator sees.

The agent must exist and not be revoked. A grant that breaks the skill type's schema is a 400 listing each violation, before anyone is asked to approve it.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
agentId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
skillType
required
string^[a-z0-9-]{1,100}/[1-9][0-9]{0,5}$

name/version of a registered skill type.

application
required
string [ 1 .. 200 ] characters

The application the skill is valid in, and only there.

verifierOrgId
required
string <uuid>

The organisation on this platform the agent may present this skill to (typically the application's own organisation, the verifier). Part of what the administrator approves and of the terms hash: the agent can present the skill to no other organisation, so its limits are not shown to a verifier nobody named.

constraints
required
object

What the agent may not exceed; its shape is the skill type's own. IBANs in upper-case canonical form. Anything else is a 400.

  • payment-order-create/1: currency (EUR), max_amount_per_order (above 0, at most 100000), debtor_ibans and payees (both required and non-empty).
  • payment-order-create/2: as version 1, plus payee_policy (required, listed or any, no default) and max_amount_per_day. With listed, payees is required and non-empty, and max_amount_per_day is optional. With any, payees must be absent (an empty list is refused too) and max_amount_per_day is required. max_amount_per_day is at least max_amount_per_order and at most 100 times it.
  • account-transactions-read/1: account_ibans (required, 1 to 100, unique), history_from (optional date, not in the future) and include_credits (required boolean). Nothing else.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "skillType": "payment-order-create/1",
  • "application": "string",
  • "verifierOrgId": "eb536923-e647-4c69-a0ee-3bc3e555947a",
  • "constraints": {
    }
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "approvalId": "23bbe807-dea1-4601-b208-07fd1aaad2b6",
  • "nonce": "string",
  • "termsHash": "string",
  • "terms": {
    },
  • "expiresAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "maxAgeSeconds": 0
}

Approve the grant with step-up authentication (step 3 of 3)

Admin only, console session, the same administrator who started the approval. Authenticated with the access token as usual; the body carries the ID token from the re-authentication of step 2.

Refused with 403 unless the ID token is validly signed by the identity provider, belongs to the signed-in user, carries this approval's nonce, reports an auth_time within the freshness window and not before the approval was requested, and used multi-factor authentication (amr contains mfa; always required: a password alone is a 403, and no setting turns it off). A refusal leaves the approval unspent, so the administrator can authenticate again. A valid approval is spent exactly once; a replay is a 404.

409 if, between the request and the approval, the agent was revoked, its key changed, or the skill template's validity changed: what the administrator was shown no longer holds.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
agentId
required
string <uuid>
approvalId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
idToken
required
string

The ID token returned by the identity provider when the administrator re-authenticated for this approval.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "idToken": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "skillId": "97d3165d-e1dd-4955-972c-95ebf04dd091",
  • "credentialId": "f568fec0-10b6-4b94-9daf-e62c50c9bf3e",
  • "termsHash": "string",
  • "expiresAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Withdraw a skill grant

Admin only, console session. Flips the credential's status-list entry, so a relying party that checks status sees it revoked, and marks the grant. No step-up: ending an authority must be easy and can only narrow. Idempotent.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
agentId
required
string <uuid>
skillId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "skillId": "97d3165d-e1dd-4955-972c-95ebf04dd091",
  • "revoked": true,
  • "revokedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Answer a verifier's login request with an agent's credentials

API key with the admin or the agent-present scope. The same act as the MCP tool present_to_request, for a backend that is not an MCP client: the verifier's own server passes the authorizationRequest it created, and the platform signs the agent's identity and the skill it was granted for the audience and nonce of the request the verifier stored, and submits them. The skill goes only to the organisation its approver named, and only while the grant is active. Requests for the Digital Credentials API, with encrypted responses (jarm) or for the same-device flow (redirectUri) are refused, as are requests of other platforms.

An agent-present key may present only for the agents in its agentIds and to the verifiers in its verifierOrgIds; anything else is 403, and is audited as agent.present_refused. An admin key may present for any agent of its organisation.

A refusal by the verifier is an outcome, not an error: it comes back as 200 with accepted: false and the error codes per credential in outcome.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
path Parameters
agentId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
request
required
string [ 1 .. 8000 ] characters

The verifier's authorizationRequest: an openid4vp:// URI, or its request_uri.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "request": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "requestId": "d385ab22-0f51-4b97-9ecd-b8ff3fd4fcb6",
  • "verifierOrgId": "eb536923-e647-4c69-a0ee-3bc3e555947a",
  • "accepted": true,
  • "presented": [
    ],
  • "outcome": [
    ]
}

Credentials

Issuance and verification, API-key-authenticated (PRD §5.4, §5.5)

Issue a credential

API-key-authenticated (issue scope), not a console token — there is deliberately no {orgId} in this path; the API key itself is the tenant selector, the same way a Stripe key implies your account.

The org's Ed25519 signing key is provisioned lazily on first issuance (one key per org for Phase 0) and reused after. The platform constructs and encodes the JWS header/payload itself and sends only opaque signing-input bytes to the isolated signing service — it never sees credential content, and the platform never sees the private key (Architecture §5).

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
Request Body schema: application/json
required
templateId
required
string <uuid>
subjectClaims
required
object

Checked against the template's claimsSchema only when the template sets enforceClaimsSchema; a violation is a 400 with a violations list.

format
string
Default: "vc+jwt"
Enum: "vc+jwt" "vc11+ld" "vc20" "dc+sd-jwt" "mso_mdoc"

Which of the template's declared formats to render. Defaults to vc+jwt (the Phase 0 format) when omitted, so pre-Phase 1 callers are unaffected. Implemented: vc+jwt, vc20, vc11+ld, dc+sd-jwt (SD-JWT VC — every subject claim selectively disclosable, registered claims in the clear).

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "templateId": "196100ac-4eec-4fb6-a7f7-86c8b584771d",
  • "subjectClaims": { },
  • "format": "vc+jwt"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "format": "vc+jwt",
  • "credential": "string",
  • "issuedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "validFrom": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "validUntil": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Verify a credential

API-key-authenticated (verify scope). Signature verification never calls the signing service — the issuer identifier is a did:jwk, which embeds the public key directly, so resolving it is pure decoding, not a network round trip. Always returns 201 with a verified boolean and an errors array, whether the credential is valid or not — a malformed or invalid credential is a successful API call that reports failure, not an HTTP error. Audited either way (PRD §5.8's "pass/fail + reason").

Credentials carrying a credentialStatus entry additionally get a revocation check after signature verification, and it fails closed: a flipped bit yields revoked, and a status list that cannot be fetched or signature-verified yields status_unavailable — both are verification failures, since "could not determine revocation state" must not read as "valid". The platform's own lists are read locally; third-party lists are fetched over HTTP and signature-verified before a single bit is trusted.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
Request Body schema: application/json
required
credential
required
string non-empty

The wire credential to verify — compact JWT (vc+jwt / vc20), compact SD-JWT VC presentation, or a JSON-serialized vc11+ld credential document. The format is auto-detected: a leading { means JSON-LD, otherwise the JOSE typ header decides (falling back to the ~ separator), so there is no format field to pass. SD-JWT VC presentations may carry a key-binding JWT; it is verified against the credential's cnf key when present.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "credential": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "verified": true,
  • "format": "vc+jwt",
  • "errors": [
    ],
  • "credential": {
    }
}

Revocation

Bitstring Status List v1.0 revocation (PRD §5.6, Architecture §4). Templates that declare revocable: true get a status entry allocated at issuance and a credentialStatus object embedded in the rendered credential (vc+jwt and vc20 formats). Revocation flips the credential's bit; verification then reports revoked.

The status list itself is served publicly at the host root (not under /api), because its URL is baked verbatim into issued credentials as statusListCredential and any relying party must be able to fetch it:

  • GET /status-lists/{orgId}/{listId} — the signed status list (W3C BitstringStatusList, served as a Verifiable Credential; used by vc+jwt and vc20)
  • GET /token-status-lists/{orgId}/{listId} — the IETF Token Status List, served as a statuslist+jwt; used by dc+sd-jwt, whose own specification requires this mechanism rather than the W3C one credential, a W3C VC 2.0 secured as a JWT (verifiable exactly like any vc20 credential this platform issues). Reveals only bit positions — never which credential or subject an index belongs to.

Revoke a credential

API-key-authenticated (issue scope — the key that may create an org's credentials is the one that may end them; a verify-only key can do neither). Flips the credential's bit on its status list and stamps revokedAt, in one transaction, audited as credential.revoked. Idempotent: revoking an already-revoked credential returns the original revocation without a second audit event. Only credentials whose template declared revocable: true can be revoked — anything else can only expire.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
path Parameters
credentialId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "revoked": true,
  • "revokedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Credential Lifecycle

Console-facing counterpart to Revocation's /credentials/{id}/revoke — same underlying mechanism, admin-session-authenticated instead of API-key-authenticated, plus list and suspend/reactivate.

Suspend is reversible (card-block-style) and reachable only for dc+sd-jwt credentials (IETF Token Status List, whose 2-bit field has room for it) — W3C BitstringStatusList (vc+jwt/vc20) is 1-bit and has no suspended state, so suspending one of those is rejected. Revoke remains permanent for every format; a revoked credential can never be suspended or reactivated.

List this org's issued credentials

Admin and auditor. Newest first, offset pagination (follow hasMore, same contract as GET .../audit-events). status is computed from revokedAt/suspendedAt, not a stored column.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
query Parameters
templateId
string <uuid>
status
string
Enum: "active" "revoked" "suspended"
limit
integer [ 1 .. 200 ]
Default: 50
offset
integer >= 0
Default: 0

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "credentials": [
    ],
  • "limit": 0,
  • "offset": 0,
  • "hasMore": true
}

Revoke a credential (console session)

Admin-only. Same underlying mechanism as POST /credentials/{id}/revoke (Revocation tag) — permanent, idempotent, audited as credential.revoked with actorType: user instead of api_key.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
credentialId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "revoked": true,
  • "revokedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Suspend a credential

Admin-only. Reversible (unlike revoke) — only for dc+sd-jwt credentials; rejected for vc+jwt/vc20 (no suspended state in BitstringStatusList). Rejected if the credential is already revoked. Idempotent if already suspended.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
credentialId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "suspended": true,
  • "suspendedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Reactivate a suspended credential

Admin-only. Rejected if the credential is not currently suspended, or if it has been revoked (permanent — cannot be undone this way).

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
credentialId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "suspended": true,
  • "suspendedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Audit

Read side of the append-only audit trail (PRD §5.8) — admin and auditor roles

Query the audit trail

Readable by admin and auditor members — the auditor role is the PRD §4 compliance persona, and this endpoint is what it exists for. Newest-first, offset-paginated; hasMore is computed by fetching one extra row, not by counting an append-only table. Rows are immutable at the database layer (the app role has no UPDATE/DELETE grants on audit_events).

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
query Parameters
action
string

Exact match on the dotted action, e.g. credential.issued.

resourceType
string

e.g. credential, api_key, org, credential_template.

from
string <date-time>

Inclusive lower bound on the event timestamp.

to
string <date-time>

Exclusive upper bound on the event timestamp.

limit
integer [ 1 .. 200 ]
Default: 50
offset
integer >= 0
Default: 0

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "events": [
    ],
  • "limit": 0,
  • "offset": 0,
  • "hasMore": true
}

Usage

Daily usage metering per organization (PRD §5.7) — credentials issued, verifications, and API calls. Counts only; there is no invoicing or payment surface. Credential counters are fed asynchronously from the same events the audit trail records, so they can lag it by a few seconds; api.call counts every successfully authenticated API-key request.

Get usage for an organization

Readable by admin and billing. Daily counters in UTC days, defaulting to a trailing 30-day window. Days with no activity are omitted, as are metrics with no activity on a given day.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
query Parameters
from
string <date>

Inclusive lower bound (ISO date). Defaults to 29 days before to.

to
string <date>

Inclusive upper bound (ISO date). Defaults to today (UTC).

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "from": "2019-08-24",
  • "to": "2019-08-24",
  • "days": [
    ],
  • "totals": {
    }
}

Webhooks

Outbound HTTP callbacks when credentials are issued, verified or revoked (PRD §5.9).

Each delivery is a POST whose body is { id, topic, orgId, occurredAt, data } and which carries three headers: X-VCP-Topic, X-VCP-Delivery-Id (stable across retries — deduplicate on it), and X-VCP-Signature.

Verifying the signature. X-VCP-Signature has the form t=<unix-seconds>,v1=<hex>, where v1 is HMAC-SHA256(secret, "<t>.<raw-body>"). Compute it over the raw request body before any JSON parsing, compare in constant time, and reject timestamps outside your tolerance — t is inside the signed material, so it cannot be rewritten without invalidating the signature. The secret is returned exactly once, when the subscription is created or its secret rotated.

Delivery is at-least-once. Failures retry with backoff (1m, 5m, 30m, 2h, 6h) and are then marked failed; every attempt is visible in the delivery log. Targets must be public HTTPS endpoints — addresses that resolve to private or link-local ranges are rejected.

List webhook subscriptions

Admin-only. Signing secrets are never returned — see the create and rotate operations.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Create a webhook subscription

Admin-only. Returns the signing secret exactly once, in this response — store it now; it cannot be read back, only rotated.

The target must be a public HTTPS URL. Hostnames are resolved and rejected if they point at loopback, private, CGNAT or link-local addresses, so a subscription cannot be used to probe the platform's own network.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
url
required
string <uri>

Public HTTPS endpoint. Private and link-local targets are rejected.

topics
required
Array of strings (WebhookTopic) non-empty
Items Enum: "credential.issued" "credential.verified" "credential.revoked"
description
string <= 200 characters

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "topics": [
    ],
  • "description": "string",
  • "enabled": true,
  • "createdBy": "25a02396-1048-48f9-bf93-102d2fb7895e",
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "secret": "whsec_8Kj2mNp4qRs7tVw9xYz1AbCd"
}

List delivery attempts

Admin-only. Newest first. Offset pagination with a hasMore flag rather than a total count — follow hasMore, not arithmetic on a total.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
query Parameters
subscriptionId
string <uuid>
status
string (WebhookDeliveryStatus)
Enum: "pending" "delivering" "succeeded" "failed"
limit
integer [ 1 .. 200 ]
Default: 50
offset
integer >= 0
Default: 0

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "deliveries": [
    ],
  • "limit": 0,
  • "offset": 0,
  • "hasMore": true
}

Update a webhook subscription

Admin-only, partial update. Setting enabled to false pauses deliveries without discarding the subscription or its secret.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
id
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
url
string <uri>
topics
Array of strings (WebhookTopic) non-empty
Items Enum: "credential.issued" "credential.verified" "credential.revoked"
description
string <= 200 characters
enabled
boolean

False pauses deliveries; the subscription and its secret survive.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "topics": [
    ],
  • "description": "string",
  • "enabled": true
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "topics": [
    ],
  • "description": "string",
  • "enabled": true,
  • "createdBy": "25a02396-1048-48f9-bf93-102d2fb7895e",
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Delete a webhook subscription

Admin-only. Its delivery history goes with it.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
id
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

Rotate the signing secret

Admin-only. Returns the new secret exactly once. Rotation takes effect immediately: deliveries queued but not yet sent are signed with the new secret, so update your receiver before rotating if you cannot tolerate rejected deliveries.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
id
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "topics": [
    ],
  • "description": "string",
  • "enabled": true,
  • "createdBy": "25a02396-1048-48f9-bf93-102d2fb7895e",
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "secret": "whsec_8Kj2mNp4qRs7tVw9xYz1AbCd"
}

RP Identity

This org's Wallet-Relying Party trust material (ARF, per-org): an RPAC (ETSI TS 119 411-8) proves who the RP is and signs OpenID4VP JAR requests; an RPRC (ETSI TS 119 475), optional, states what the RP may request.

Getting a real RPAC has two steps. First, generate a CSR — this mints a keypair and returns a PEM CSR to submit to a real registrar/QTSP. The CSR is shown once; if it's lost before being copied, generate a new one (the abandoned key is harmless). Second, once the registrar issues the certificate, import it — a PEM chain (leaf first, plus any intermediates), checked against the CSR this same org generated.

An RPRC has no CSR step — it's a self-contained JWT the registrar issues and signs itself, imported directly. Its organizationIdentifier must match the org's current RPAC.

Get this org's RP identity

Admin-only. One fetch for the whole screen: the current RPAC (if any), the current RPRC (if any), and a pending RPAC CSR (if one was generated but not yet imported).

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "rpac": {
    },
  • "rprc": {
    },
  • "pendingRpacCsr": {
    }
}

Generate an RPAC CSR

Admin-only. Mints a keypair and returns a PEM PKCS#10 CSR naming organizationIdentifier, for manual submission to a real registrar/QTSP. Replaces any previously generated, not-yet-imported CSR for this org — the abandoned key is harmless.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
organizationIdentifier
required
string <= 200 characters

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "organizationIdentifier": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "csrPem": "string"
}

Import a real RPAC

Admin-only. organizationIdentifier must match the org's pending CSR (400 otherwise — including when there is no pending CSR at all). certificateChainPem is one or more concatenated -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- blocks, leaf first.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
organizationIdentifier
required
string <= 200 characters

Must match the pending CSR's — rejected otherwise.

certificateChainPem
required
string

PEM, one or more concatenated certificate blocks, leaf first.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "organizationIdentifier": "string",
  • "certificateChainPem": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "organizationIdentifier": "string",
  • "source": "sandbox-self-signed",
  • "certificateChainPem": "string",
  • "notBefore": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "notAfter": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Import a real RPRC

Admin-only. No CSR step — an RPRC is a self-contained JWT the registrar issues and signs itself, stored verbatim. organizationIdentifier must match the org's current RPAC, if one is active (400 otherwise).

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
jwt
required
string
organizationIdentifier
required
string <= 200 characters

Must match the org's current RPAC, if one is active — rejected otherwise.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "jwt": "string",
  • "organizationIdentifier": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "jwt": "string",
  • "organizationIdentifier": "string",
  • "source": "sandbox-self-signed",
  • "notBefore": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "notAfter": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Issuer Trust Anchors

The X.509 trust anchors of issuers outside the platform (an EUDI PID provider, an mDL issuing authority, a partner) whose credentials this org's presentation requests may accept. Per org: an anchor affects only requests of the org that added it, and only those that name it. Kept apart from the platform's own issuer trust, so an outside CA can never vouch for a credential that claims to come from an organisation on the platform.

List the trust anchors of outside issuers this org accepts

Admin-only. Every anchor, with enough of each certificate to recognise it. A presentation request names the ones it accepts by id in credentials[].issuer.trustAnchorIds.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
[
  • {
    }
]

Accept credentials from issuers under another trust anchor

Admin-only. certificate is one X.509 certificate, as PEM or base64 DER, that can certify keys: a CA (basicConstraints CA:TRUE) or a self-signed root. Rejected (400) if it is not exactly one certificate, has expired, is an end-entity certificate, or the label is blank; 409 if the org already has that certificate or that label (labels compare case-insensitively). An org can have at most 50.

Adding an anchor lets anyone holding a key it certifies issue credentials this org accepts, in requests that name the anchor. It never affects credentials issued on the platform, which are checked against the platform's own issuer keys.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
label
required
string <= 80 characters

A name for the list, unique per org (case-insensitively).

certificate
required
string <= 20000 characters

PEM or base64 DER of exactly one X.509 CA or self-signed root certificate.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "label": "string",
  • "certificate": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "label": "string",
  • "subject": "string",
  • "issuer": "string",
  • "serialNumber": "string",
  • "fingerprintSha256": "string",
  • "spkiSha256": "string",
  • "ca": true,
  • "selfSigned": true,
  • "notBefore": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "notAfter": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "expired": true,
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Stop accepting credentials under a trust anchor

Admin-only. Takes effect at once, including for requests already created: verification re-reads the anchors a request names.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
anchorId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

Wallet Providers

Which Wallet Providers this org's issuance endpoints believe. A wallet proves what it is with a client attestation (at PAR and the token endpoint) and, for a credential that requires one, a key attestation (in the credential request's proof); both are signed by its Wallet Provider, and are accepted only if that signature chains to a certificate listed here. In ARF terms these are the Wallet Providers an Attestation Provider accepts.

The platform's own reference Wallet Provider (the one behind the reference wallets) is on the list by default, registered automatically the first time it is needed. Add another provider's attestation-signing CA, or a pinned signing certificate, to accept that provider's wallets. Turn the reference provider off to stop accepting it for this org; its row stays listed, since removing it would only have it registered again.

Admin-only, reads included. Adding an entry lets another provider's wallets authenticate to this org, so every change is audited (wallet_provider.added, wallet_provider.removed, wallet_provider.reference_trust_changed).

List the Wallet Providers this org trusts

Admin-only. Every trust anchor, the reference provider's included (reference: true), with enough of each certificate to recognise it. referenceProviderTrusted says whether the reference provider is accepted for this org; referenceProviderAvailable whether this deployment runs one at all.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "referenceProviderTrusted": true,
  • "referenceProviderAvailable": true,
  • "providers": [
    ]
}

Trust another Wallet Provider

Admin-only. certificate is one X.509 certificate, as PEM or base64 DER: the provider's attestation-signing CA, or a pinned signing certificate. Rejected (400) if it is not exactly one certificate, has expired, or the label is blank or reserved; 409 if the org already trusts that certificate or has a provider with that label (labels compare case-insensitively). An org can trust at most 20.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
label
required
string <= 80 characters

A name for the list, unique per org (case-insensitively). platform-reference-issuer is reserved.

certificate
required
string <= 20000 characters

PEM or base64 DER of exactly one X.509 certificate.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "label": "string",
  • "certificate": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "label": "string",
  • "reference": true,
  • "subject": "string",
  • "issuer": "string",
  • "serialNumber": "string",
  • "fingerprintSha256": "string",
  • "ca": true,
  • "notBefore": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "notAfter": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z",
  • "expired": true,
  • "createdAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Trust, or stop trusting, the platform's reference Wallet Provider

Admin-only. trusted: false makes this org stop accepting the reference provider's attestations and stops it being registered again, including before it was ever registered. It works whether or not the reference provider's row exists and survives its certificate changing. trusted: true restores the default.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
trusted
required
boolean

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "trusted": true
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "referenceProviderTrusted": true,
  • "referenceProviderAvailable": true,
  • "providers": [
    ]
}

Stop trusting a Wallet Provider

Admin-only. Removes a provider an admin added; wallets it vouched for can no longer authenticate to this org. The reference provider cannot be removed (400), only switched off with PUT /orgs/{orgId}/wallet-providers/reference.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
providerId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "statusCode": 0,
  • "error": "string",
  • "message": "string"
}

Verification Policy

The configurable half of this org's OpenID4VP/SCA verification checks — everything else (issuer trust, revocation status) is hardcoded, not policy. All three fields are optional; omitted means "use the default," and an org that never calls this endpoint gets exactly today's behavior.

iatWindowSeconds bounds how old a presentation's key-binding JWT may be (null/omitted: unbounded, no check). minAmrCategories raises TS12 §3.6's own floor of 2 distinct authentication categories — it can never be set below that floor. allowedTransactionDataTypes restricts which transaction_data.type values this org's own backend may request when creating a presentation request (null/ omitted: unrestricted, any type build-transaction-data can encode).

No trusted-issuer allowlist: this org's verifier only ever accepts credentials issued by itself today, so one would have no effect until third-party-requested verification ships.

Get this org's verification policy

Admin-only. Always returns a full policy, even for an org that has never configured one — updatedAt: null distinguishes "defaults, never set" from "explicitly set to these values."

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "iatWindowSeconds": 0,
  • "minAmrCategories": 0,
  • "allowedTransactionDataTypes": [
    ],
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

Update this org's verification policy

Admin-only, partial update — an omitted field is left unchanged. null explicitly resets iatWindowSeconds/allowedTransactionDataTypes to unrestricted; an empty array is rejected for allowedTransactionDataTypes (ambiguous between "unrestricted" and "allow nothing"). minAmrCategories below 2 is rejected outright — that floor is a TS12 §3.6 conformance requirement, not a preference.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
orgId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
iatWindowSeconds
integer or null [ 1 .. 3600 ]
minAmrCategories
integer [ 2 .. 10 ]
allowedTransactionDataTypes
Array of strings or null non-empty

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "iatWindowSeconds": 1,
  • "minAmrCategories": 2,
  • "allowedTransactionDataTypes": [
    ]
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "iatWindowSeconds": 0,
  • "minAmrCategories": 0,
  • "allowedTransactionDataTypes": [
    ],
  • "updatedAt": "2019-08-24T14:15:22Z"
}

OpenID4VCI

OpenID4VCI 1.0 Final issuance (PRD §5.4, Architecture §4). Only offer creation lives under /api — the wallet-facing protocol endpoints sit at the host root, because every org is its own credential issuer at {publicUrl}/oid4vci/{orgId}. Two grant types are supported, both requiring Wallet Instance Attestation: the pre-authorized code flow below (no PAR, no DPoP, but client attestation required since the pre-authorized_code Wallet Attestation CR gave it parity with authorization_code), and, since Phase 2, a full authorization_code flow gated by PAR, PKCE, a real browser login, client attestation and DPoP — see AUTHORIZED_FLOW_ARCHITECTURE.md for the wire-level detail this section deliberately doesn't repeat:

  • GET /.well-known/openid-credential-issuer/oid4vci/{orgId} — issuer metadata
  • GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server/oid4vci/{orgId} — AS metadata
  • GET /oid4vci/{orgId}/jwks — org public key set (access-token verification)
  • POST /oid4vci/{orgId}/par — RFC 9126 pushed authorization request; starts the authorization_code grant (not used by the pre-authorized-code grant)
  • GET /oid4vci/{orgId}/authorize — the browser lands here after PAR; completes silently if a login session cookie already covers this org, otherwise renders a minimal login form
  • POST /oid4vci/{orgId}/authorize — the login form's submit target; redirects the browser back to the wallet with an authorization code
  • POST /oid4vci/{orgId}/token — exchanges either grant (pre-authorized code, or the authorization code from the flow above) for an access token; both require a Client Attestation JWT (OAuth-Client-Attestation/-PoP headers) — anonymous requests are rejected on both grants
  • POST /oid4vci/{orgId}/nonce — c_nonce endpoint (Final's dedicated nonce endpoint); Cache-Control: no-store, like the token, PAR and credential responses
  • POST /oid4vci/{orgId}/credential — proof-of-possession → SD-JWT VC. The response carries the credential as Final's credentials: [{ "credential": … }] and, until the deployed wallets have moved, also as the pre-Final credential. Unknown credential_configuration_id → unknown_credential_configuration; any credential_identifier → unknown_credential_identifier (this issuer hands none out)
  • POST /oid4vci/{orgId}/notification — wallet reports what it did with the issued credential (credential_accepted / credential_failure / credential_deleted), same access token as the credential endpoint. Optional per spec; when a wallet sends credential_accepted, GET /credentials/offers/{offerId} reports confirmed instead of accepted.

Wire formats for those are defined by the OpenID4VCI / OAuth2 specs, not re-documented here; conforming wallets discover everything from the credential offer URI returned by POST /credentials/offers.

Client Attestation and Key Attestation issuance — what a wallet needs before it can even reach the endpoints above — used to be documented here as prose under this file's own Attestations/ Key Attestations tags. Both moved to apps/wallet-backend/docs/openapi.yaml when that issuance surface was carved out into its own deployable for security isolation (Client/Key Attestation are the only fully unauthenticated, pre-auth routes anywhere on this system) — see the Wallet Backend API reference, linked from this site's sidebar, for the full contract.

Create a credential offer

Starts the OpenID4VCI pre-authorized code flow: the org's backend (API key, issue scope) states what to issue; the response's credentialOffer URI goes to the holder as a QR code / deep link, and their wallet drives the rest against the wallet-facing endpoints (see the OpenID4VCI tag). The offer expires after expiresIn seconds, the pre-authorized code is single-use, and the credential is bound to the wallet's proof-of-possession key (cnf) at the credential endpoint — subject claims are fixed here, at offer time.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
Request Body schema: application/json
required
templateId
required
string <uuid>
subjectClaims
required
object

Fixed at offer time — the wallet receives exactly these claims. For a template with enforceClaimsSchema, claims its schema rejects are refused here with a 400, not when the wallet collects the credential.

format
string
Default: "dc+sd-jwt"
Enum: "vc+jwt" "vc11+ld" "vc20" "dc+sd-jwt" "mso_mdoc"

Defaults to dc+sd-jwt. dc+sd-jwt and mso_mdoc are both OpenID4VCI-offerable; vc+jwt, vc20, and vc11+ld are issued only via the direct POST /credentials endpoint, not as an OpenID4VCI offer. Must also be listed in the template's own formats, or the request is rejected.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "templateId": "196100ac-4eec-4fb6-a7f7-86c8b584771d",
  • "subjectClaims": { },
  • "format": "dc+sd-jwt"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "credentialOffer": "string",
  • "credentialOfferObject": { },
  • "expiresIn": 0,
  • "offerId": "42da58f8-9040-4cf5-98ce-bce9965cca0d"
}

Poll a credential offer

Requires an API key with the issue scope — same requirement as creating the offer.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
path Parameters
offerId
required
string <uuid>

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "status": "pending",
  • "credentialId": "f568fec0-10b6-4b94-9daf-e62c50c9bf3e",
  • "holderKeyId": "string",
  • "error": "attestation_required"
}

OpenID4VP

OpenID4VP 1.0 Final relying-party flow with DCQL (PRD §5.5, Architecture §4). The org's backend creates a presentation request — by default JAR-signed (RFC 9101) with this platform's ACME verifier certificate, x509_hash client-id scheme (HAIP 1.0 §5), delivered via request_uri; pass signed: false for the unsigned, by-value, redirect_uri client-id form instead — shows the returned openid4vp:// URI to the holder, and polls the request for the outcome. Two more opt-in knobs on the same request, both independent of signed: trustModel: 'rpac' signs under the EUDI ARF Relying-Party trust model (ETSI TS 119 411-8) instead of the default ACME/web-pki anchor and attaches an RPRC via verifier_info (ETSI TS 119 475, sandbox-only); jarm: true has the wallet answer encrypted, direct_post.jwt, instead of plain direct_post — encrypt-only (an unsigned JWT, encrypted), per OpenID4VP 1.0's own definition, not the generic JARM spec's sign-and-encrypt option it replaced. See CreatePresentationRequest for both. The wallet answers by direct_post (or direct_post.jwt if jarm) to the wallet-facing endpoint at the host root:

  • POST /oid4vp/{orgId}/response/{requestId} — authorization response (vp_token with DCQL-keyed SD-JWT VC presentations)

Presentations must carry a key-binding JWT: its signature is checked against the credential's cnf key, and its nonce/aud must match this exact request — a presentation captured from one exchange cannot be replayed into another.

Create a presentation request

Starts an OpenID4VP exchange (API key, verify scope): names the credential type(s) being asked for (by template) and optionally which claims the wallet should disclose. Poll the returned id for the outcome; the request expires after expiresIn seconds. Asking for several credentials at once (credentials) still produces one URI, one wallet screen, one response.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
Request Body schema: application/json
required
templateId
string <uuid>

Template whose credential type is being asked for. For dc+sd-jwt, vct = the template name; for mso_mdoc, docType = the template name. Mutually exclusive with credentials.

format
string
Default: "dc+sd-jwt"
Enum: "vc+jwt" "vc11+ld" "vc20" "dc+sd-jwt" "mso_mdoc"

Defaults to dc+sd-jwt. dc+sd-jwt and mso_mdoc are both presentable; must also be listed in the template's own formats. Changes the DCQL query shape: for dc+sd-jwt each requestedClaims entry becomes the path [name]; for mso_mdoc it becomes [namespace, name], where the namespace is the template's mdocNamespace, else org.iso.18013.5.1 for a template named org.iso.18013.5.1.mDL, else the template name (the docType is always the template name). Only used with templateId — set format per entry inside credentials instead.

requestedClaims
Array of strings

Claim names the wallet is asked to disclose. Omitted = the wallet decides. Only used with templateId — set requestedClaims per entry inside credentials instead.

signed
boolean
Default: true

JAR-sign the request (RFC 9101) with this platform's ACME verifier certificate, x509_hash client-id scheme (HAIP 1.0 §5), delivered via request_uri rather than by value. Defaults to true. Pass false for the old unsigned redirect_uri client-id form, which needs no verifier certificate.

trustModel
string
Default: "web-pki"
Enum: "web-pki" "rpac"

Which certificate authenticates this request's JAR signature, when signed (default true). Both use the identical x509_hash client-id scheme — only the certificate issuer and trust anchor differ. web-pki (default) is today's ACME certificate, unchanged. rpac opts into the EUDI ARF Relying-Party trust model instead (ETSI TS 119 411-8) and attaches an RPRC (ETSI TS 119 475) via the request's verifier_info; requires an RPAC to already be active for this deployment, or the request fails with 503 — sandbox-only today. Ignored entirely when signed: false.

jarm
boolean
Default: false

Request the wallet deliver its authorization response encrypted (response_mode=direct_post.jwt) instead of plain direct_post. Encrypt-only — an unsigned JWT, encrypted ECDH-ES with A128GCM or A256GCM (HAIP 1.0 §5) against a fresh per-request keypair (no certificate needed, unlike signed) — per OpenID4VP 1.0's own definition; it dropped the generic JARM spec's sign-and-encrypt option (openid/OpenID4VP#463: "implementations MUST use an unsigned, encrypted JWT"). Defaults to false.

redirectUri
string <uri>

Same-device flow (HAIP 1.0 §5.1, OpenID4VP 1.0 §8.2): the page the wallet sends the user back to after posting its response. The wallet is answered with redirect_uri: <redirectUri>#response_code=<random> whether or not the presentation verified, and polling withholds the results (status: responded) until called with that responseCode. Read the code in the page that started the request and pass it from your backend: only the browser the wallet redirected holds it, which binds the presentation to that user's session (OpenID4VP 1.0 §13.3). The presentation.verified webhook carries responseCodeRequired: true for such a request: don't act on it until the code has come back. https (plain http only for localhost), no fragment. Not allowed with dcApiOrigin.

dcApiOrigin
string

Deliver the request over the W3C Digital Credentials API (OpenID4VP 1.0 Appendix A) instead of an openid4vp:// URI: the web origin of the page that will call navigator.credentials.get(). Must be a bare origin — https, or plain http for localhost only; a single trailing / is dropped. The response then carries digitalCredentialRequest instead of authorizationRequest, and the wallet's answer comes back through your page — submit it to POST /presentations/requests/{requestId}/response.

The browser attests this origin to the wallet, and every presentation is bound to it: the KB-JWT aud is origin:<dcApiOrigin> even for signed requests (Appendix A.4), and mdoc's SessionTranscript uses the DC API handover (§B.2.6.2). Always response_mode=dc_api.jwt (HAIP 1.0), so jarm is implied and jarm: false is rejected. signed works as usual; a signed request carries expected_origins: [dcApiOrigin] and travels by value, never via request_uri.

dcApiProtocols
Array of strings non-empty unique
Items Enum: "openid4vp" "org-iso-mdoc"

Which DC API protocols to offer, in order of preference; the browser uses the first one a wallet on the device supports. Only with dcApiOrigin. Omitted = [openid4vp], exactly as before.

org-iso-mdoc is ISO/IEC TS 18013-7 Annex C, the only protocol Safari on iOS hands to third-party wallets (ARF v3.0.0 OIA_08b). It needs exactly one mso_mdoc credential and carries an ISO DeviceRequest (version 1.0) for it, asking for requestedClaims (or every claimsSchema property when omitted) under the template's mdoc namespace, with intentToRetain false, plus an EncryptionInfo holding a fresh P-256 key: the wallet's answer is HPKE-encrypted to it and bound to dcApiOrigin. No transactionData. It is signed with reader authentication (ISO/IEC 18013-5 §9.1.4, the org's RPAC, ARF RPA_01 to RPA_03) only with trustModel: rpac; otherwise it is unsigned, which Safari and wallets accept with a warning. An explicit signed: true without trustModel: rpac is rejected.

When this field is given, the response lists every request in digitalCredentialRequests.

Array of objects [ 1 .. 10 ] items

Ask for several credentials in one request: one openid4vp:// URI, one wallet claim-selection screen, one direct_post response. Every entry is mandatory — the exchange only verifies once the wallet has answered all of them. Mutually exclusive with the top-level templateId.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "templateId": "196100ac-4eec-4fb6-a7f7-86c8b584771d",
  • "format": "dc+sd-jwt",
  • "requestedClaims": [
    ],
  • "signed": true,
  • "trustModel": "web-pki",
  • "jarm": false,
  • "dcApiOrigin": "https://shop.example.com",
  • "dcApiProtocols": [
    ],
  • "credentials": [
    ]
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
Example
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "authorizationRequest": "string",
  • "expiresIn": 0
}

Poll a presentation request

Requires an API key with the verify scope — same requirement as creating the request.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
path Parameters
requestId
required
string <uuid>
query Parameters
responseCode
string

Same-device requests (redirectUri) only: the value the wallet's redirect carried in its #response_code= fragment. Until it is given, an answered request reports status: responded and no results; a wrong value is a 403.

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "status": "pending",
  • "responseCodeRequired": true,
  • "vct": "string",
  • "templateId": "196100ac-4eec-4fb6-a7f7-86c8b584771d",
  • "result": {
    },
  • "results": [
    ]
}

Submit a Digital Credentials API response

Only for requests created with dcApiOrigin (OpenID4VP 1.0 Appendix A). Over the DC API the browser hands the wallet's answer to your page, not to this platform, so your backend forwards it here: the data member of the DigitalCredential that navigator.credentials.get() resolved with, verbatim — { "response": "<JWE>" }, or { "error": "..." } when the wallet returned a protocol error (the DC API resolves, rather than rejects, in that case). Requires the verify scope.

For an org-iso-mdoc answer (ISO/IEC TS 18013-7 Annex C) response is the base64url CBOR ["dcapi", { enc, cipherText }] the wallet encrypted to the request's EncryptionInfo key. Add protocol (DigitalCredential.protocol) so the platform knows which protocol is answering; it is optional when the request offered one protocol, and otherwise inferred from the shape of response.

Answers 200 with the same body as polling, whether or not the presentation verified — check status. A request can be completed once; its result stays pollable until it expires.

Authorizations:
ApiKeyAuth
path Parameters
requestId
required
string <uuid>
Request Body schema: application/json
required
response
string

The encrypted authorization response (response_mode=dc_api.jwt).

error
string

A wallet-side OpenID4VP error code (§8.5), reported back as wallet_error.

error_description
string
protocol
string

DigitalCredential.protocol — org-iso-mdoc, or an openid4vp-v1-* value. Must be one the request offered.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "response": "string",
  • "error": "string",
  • "error_description": "string",
  • "protocol": "string"
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "status": "pending",
  • "responseCodeRequired": true,
  • "vct": "string",
  • "templateId": "196100ac-4eec-4fb6-a7f7-86c8b584771d",
  • "result": {
    },
  • "results": [
    ]
}

Credential Login

Logging into the console with a verifiable credential instead of Zitadel — a second front door onto the same account, not a replacement: an account must already exist (via Zitadel) and a credential must already be linked to it before login can succeed.

Both endpoint families follow the same create-request/poll shape as OpenID4VP above, reusing the same openid4vp:// request/QR-code/ deep-link UX for both same-device (a browser extension) and cross-device (a mobile wallet scanning the QR) presentation. The wallet answers by direct_post to the same wallet-facing endpoint shape as OpenID4VP, at the host root:

  • POST /oid4vp/login-response/{requestId} — authorization response

No vct/docType is requested — either flow accepts whichever credential (dc+sd-jwt or mso_mdoc) the wallet offers. What decides acceptance is the credential's ID (its jti for dc+sd-jwt; a hash of the holder's bound key for mso_mdoc, which has no jti-equivalent claim) matching an entry already on a user profile — an unrecognized credential is rejected outright, never auto-provisioned into a new account. On a successful login, the disclosed name/email sync onto the profile when they differ from what's stored.

Start a credential-login exchange

Public — there is no session yet by definition. The body is optional (see CreateCredentialRequest).

Request Body schema: application/json
optional
sameDevice
boolean
Default: false

The request will be opened in a wallet on this device, not shown as a QR code. Where the deployment has CREDENTIAL_LOGIN_SAME_DEVICE_REDIRECT on (HAIP 1.0 §5.1), the wallet is then redirected to the console's own /auth/credential-callback#response_code=… (a target the platform fixes; the caller cannot choose it), and polling withholds the result until given that code. Never set it for a QR request: the redirect would land on the phone that scanned it.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "sameDevice": false
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "authorizationRequest": "string",
  • "expiresIn": 0,
  • "redirect": true
}

Poll a credential-login exchange

Public, same as creating it — the request id itself is the bearer capability. Once status is verified, accessToken/expiresIn carry the console's new session token.

path Parameters
id
required
string <uuid>
query Parameters
responseCode
string

Same-device requests only — the #response_code= the wallet's redirect to /auth/credential-callback carried. Without it an answered same-device request reports status responded and nothing else; a wrong value is a 403.

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "status": "pending",
  • "responseCodeRequired": true,
  • "accessToken": "string",
  • "expiresIn": 0,
  • "claims": {
    },
  • "errors": [
    ]
}

Start linking a credential to the caller's profile

Requires the existing Zitadel-backed console session (ConsoleBearerAuth, the default for this page). Takes no body — the target is always the authenticated caller, never a supplied user id. Linking a new credential replaces any previously linked one. The body is optional (see CreateCredentialRequest).

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
Request Body schema: application/json
optional
sameDevice
boolean
Default: false

The request will be opened in a wallet on this device, not shown as a QR code. Where the deployment has CREDENTIAL_LOGIN_SAME_DEVICE_REDIRECT on (HAIP 1.0 §5.1), the wallet is then redirected to the console's own /auth/credential-callback#response_code=… (a target the platform fixes; the caller cannot choose it), and polling withholds the result until given that code. Never set it for a QR request: the redirect would land on the phone that scanned it.

Responses

Request samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "sameDevice": false
}

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "authorizationRequest": "string",
  • "expiresIn": 0,
  • "redirect": true
}

Poll a credential-link exchange

Requires the same session that created the request — another caller's (or an unknown/expired) id reports 404, not 403, so as not to confirm a request id belongs to someone else.

Authorizations:
ConsoleBearerAuth
path Parameters
id
required
string <uuid>
query Parameters
responseCode
string

Same-device requests only — the #response_code= the wallet's redirect to /auth/credential-callback carried. Without it an answered same-device request reports status responded and nothing else; a wrong value is a 403.

Responses

Response samples

Content type
application/json
{
  • "id": "497f6eca-6276-4993-bfeb-53cbbbba6f08",
  • "status": "pending",
  • "responseCodeRequired": true,
  • "accessToken": "string",
  • "expiresIn": 0,
  • "claims": {
    },
  • "errors": [
    ]
}

MCP

An MCP (Model Context Protocol) server exposing agent-identity operations as tools — AGENT_IDENTITY_MCP_PLAN.md's Slice A: an org's own automation gets its own audit-attributable identity, not a new agent-to-agent trust model. A single Streamable HTTP endpoint, not modelled as formal paths for the same reason as OpenID4VCI/OpenID4VP above — a client discovers everything (tool names, input schemas) via the MCP protocol itself, not an OpenAPI schema:

  • POST /mcp — MCP Streamable HTTP transport (stateless: no session ID, a fresh server per request). Authorization: Bearer <api key>, same as every other API-key-authenticated route.

Tools, each a thin wrapper over an already-built operation:

  • create_agent_identity — mints a platform-custodial key and issues an AgentIdentityCredential under it. The template must be revocable. Requires the admin scope.
  • open_agent_session — the platform presents that credential on the agent's behalf (KB-JWT signed by the signing service, not the caller) and, once its own signature and nonce/aud/vct binding verify, returns a short-lived session token. The session never carries more scope than the API key that opened it. Requires admin.
  • issue_credential / verify_credential — wrap POST /credentials and POST /credentials/verify, but attribute the resulting audit event to the agent (actorType: 'agent') instead of only the API key, given a valid agentSessionToken whose session carries the matching issue/verify scope.
  • present_agent_identity — Slice B: presents the agent's credential for an audience/nonce supplied by a real external relying party (delivered to the caller out of band). Unlike open_agent_session, the platform does not verify the result itself — the external party does, using standard did:jwk/cnf.jwk/status-list checks, the same as any other dc+sd-jwt credential this platform issues. Requires admin.
  • revoke_agent_identity — revokes an agent identity: blocks future open_agent_session/present_agent_identity calls, and flips the credential's real status-list entry (the same mechanism POST /credentials/{id}/revoke uses) so an external relying party checking independently sees the same answer. Requires admin.